Introduction
Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It's the transition that's troublesome. -Issac Asimov, author The interval between the decay of the old and the formation and establishment of the new constitutes a period of transition which must always necessarily be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce fanaticism.
-John C. Calhoun, "A Disquisition on Government," 1851
The United States has been in a perpetual state of conflict since 11 September 2001 with Operations Enduring Freedom and New Dawn.
1 As Operation Enduring Freedom continues, the United States is entering its twelfth year of conflict-the longest in the country's history-with al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, and recently concluded Operation New Dawn on 14 December 2011 after eight years of conflict in Iraq. 2 The national leadership identified specific end states and objectives at the conclusion of each campaign. For Iraq, the strategy focused on "an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant." 3 Similarly, the strategy in Afghanistan relies on developing "self-reliant Afghan security forces" and an effective Afghan government. 4 Through these similar ends, the United States desires a strategic partnership with both the Iraqi and Afghan governments to strengthen U.S. national security further. Both approaches require the cessation of military-led operations and a transition to civilian-led diplomatic relationships. As the U.S. approaches the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom, it is important to remember this is not the first time the United States encountered this problem of transition from military-led operations to civilian-led diplomatic relationships. The United States' history of conflicts and transitions is important today as it approaches the closure of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Although thoughts about why war starts and how they are conducted change over time, the use of military means to achieve political ends has always been a constant. Many military theorists from Sun Tzu to Machiavelli to Clausewitz have identified this immutable principle of war, so understanding how to link them is of importance to military planners.
The transition is one of the most important parts of any campaign linking military means to achieve political ends, but it is also one of the most overlooked elements. Much of the intellectual discussion focuses on actions that occur either before or after a transition. Military discussions revolve around reforming doctrine to conduct offensive, defensive, or stability operations effectively while civilian discourse looks at new government structures or expanding civilian authorities. The civil-military realm focuses on interagency processes or whole-ofgovernment approaches to improve functionality to the government's approach to conflict.
However, most of the discussion avoids the mechanism to link all these different elements, Promote Liberty-to emphasize key points. 5 The third section expands upon the principles of successful transitions identified in the previous section. Finally, the analysis will then allow recommendations for improving efforts in future conflict to ensure planners incorporate transitions into the campaign design effectively.
5 CORDS stands for the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program.
Enabling a Successful Transition
Concepts such as whole of government approaches, interagency cooperation, and independent, military-led government institutions enter the discussion as ways to facilitate effective transitions. Although these ideas contribute to successful civilian-led diplomatic relationships in a post-conflict environment, the majority of the discourse neglects how to integrate and implement these concepts effectively, if at all, in the absence of new or revised structures. In other words, the many theories address either the lack of capacity (e.g., military
personnel trained in economic theory) or the lack of capability (e.g., the need for an interagency command and control structure), but do not address the mechanism to translate new or existing capacities and capabilities into success.
To appreciate the debate fully, the definition of transition underpins any discussion of potential opportunities, recommendations, and conclusions. According to Joint Publication 5-0, transitions are distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. 6 Since the analysis concentrates on the change from militaryled operations to civilian-led diplomatic relationships, one must realize it is more than just a shift in focus; it is also a distinct shift in effort. This combination between focus and effort is important because the shift is more than just a matter of a concentration of ideas, but exertion of energies and resources. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the definition of a transition is as a point in time in which a distinct shift in focus and effort is required to achieve strategic ends. The conceptual debate that frames a transition focuses on the synergistic effect between military and civilian agencies.
Interagency cooperation is not a new concept, but a resurgent focus on interagency processes resurfaced because of the emphasis on counterinsurgency and stability operations in recent years. Bob Ulin, CEO of the CGSC Foundation, Inc., describes that the "lack [of a system] to ensure effective interagency coordination poses a challenge." 7 Ulin also goes on to state that "there is little incentive to cooperate" between different governmental agencies because of "the difficulty, if not the inability, to delegate authority below the Presidential level across department and agency borders." 8 This lack of incentive and systems incites the discourse on how to increase the effectiveness of interagency cooperation. Among the different ideas on how to increase this efficiency, the more prevalent ones revolve around changing the physical structure of interagency or expanding its authority to produce unity of effort.
Changing the interagency structure takes on many forms, but the central idea is to introduce a new structure, such as command and control structure or a subordinate organization, or a new policy or regulation that increases the efficiency of the interagency system. promotes design as a methodology is that "design properly seeks to describe how the whole-ofgovernment will approach transforming the current situation by the harmonized actions of all agencies and other favorably interested parties." 41 The significance of Bucknam and Swain's arguments are the primacy of leveraging military planning expertise and synchronizing all elements of national power to achieve desired conditions. However, both concentrate on conceptual levels of planning omitting an approach for detailed planning.
Planning and its relation to transitions are important because the transition from military operations to civilian relationships underpins war termination. This is a key doctrinal concept. the Roosevelt administration on the role of the armed forces in government administration and a lack of civil affairs trained personnel existed within the military to do so. In the absence of strategic guidance, Rankin planners drew from experiences at the end of World War I. Morgan stated, "The sum total of all the various factors now operating cannot be far from that of the factors which caused the collapse in 1918."
History of Planning Transitions
47 Using this assumption in combination with the early start to occupation planning enabled COSSAC planners to start coordinating for resources.
In addition to an initial supposition on the number of divisions required to occupy Germany, Rankin planners identified the need to establish military government in the occupied areas. The purpose of the military government would be to "preserve law and order, and to insure that the Force Commander's instruction in regard to security, disarmament, etc. are carried out."
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The requirement for a military government exposed two additional requirements, which were that an early decision will be required for which policy to pursue; and the military government must Operation Just Cause's objectives were "to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty," and President Bush later ordered the immediate apprehension and extradition of Noriega. 63 Operation Just Cause ended on 11 January 1990. Operation Promote Liberty followed, the stability and enabling civil authority operation, but for several weeks, these two operations overlapped. 64 The significance of Operation Just Cause is when planning started, how planning evolved over time, and how planners viewed the transition from combat to stability operations. On the eve of Operation Just Cause, then, disconnects still existed between the invasion plan and the CMO plan with respect to the conduct of stability operations. This meant the tactical units preparing to take part in the invasion concentrated on their combat roles, devoting little or no attention to the stability operations they would be called on to perform, which probably would have been the case even if coordination had been better during the planning phase. 
What Makes a Successful Transition?
The previous cases studies suggest three characteristics to support successful transitions:
level of post-conflict planning prior to the conclusion of military operations, dialogue between planners not only within the military, but also between the military and the interagency community, and refinements made to the plan to establish transition criteria. The symbiotic relationship between these three characteristics reveals that early planning facilitates an open and iterative dialogue between military planners and civilian officials. This discourse then reveals the necessary requirements and end state conditions to transition operations from the military to civilian agencies. As conditions and requirements changes, planners are able to make refinements to the plan, thus allowing for a successful transition later.
Early planning is the foundation for planning a successful transition. The United States taught the South Vietnamese armed forces well on how to fight and win a conventional war against the North Vietnamese; however, the U.S. taught them the American way, with massive firepower and plenty of mobility (i.e., artillery, air and helicopters) that could only be supported by continued U.S. aid--something a war-weary U.S. public and Congress were unwilling to fund …. Indeed, if Vietnamization had any chance at all in being successful in 1975, it was thwarted by Congress' withholding of two vital prerequisites: U.S. air support and military aid. However, there were serious problems within the South Vietnam government which acted to erode American public and Congressional support. These internal problems ultimately brought about the collapse of the South Vietnamese armed forces. In preparing a major military operation, military leaders and civilian officials can effectively work together in large teams to create a well-meshed, integrated plan. This holds true, almost regardless of how well or how badly the war is going. By contrast, planning to end a war where victory seems out of reach is not a task on which men can easily collaborate. To search for an exit in such a situation, government leaders can rarely move in harmony.
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Although the events revolving around the Vietnam War frame Iklé's statements, the greater significance is that to come to a consensus between the military and policy makers when it comes to ending a war is challenging. If early planning underpins a successful transition, then the iterative revisions of the plan create opportunities for discourse between military and civilian leaders, which increases the chances of setting necessary conditions for a successful transition.
The three case studies, again, highlight this point to varying degrees. 82 Ibid. 83 Ziemke, 7. The largest item of expense, professional personnel, was $11,000 in 1942, and the total budget for 1943 was $98,680, 17 increased somewhat by expansion during the year. (17) The Rhineland occupation after World War I, which only involved a population of about one million, required 213 military government officers, or .l percent of the occupation force. On this basis, the study showed, an Army of four million men, without any allowance for the larger civilian population to lie governed, would need 4,000 officers, as many as the School of Military Government could produce in ten years (8) requirements of the military government after occupation. Furthermore, the conditions in which the occupation would occur refined the plan. As mentioned previously, Rankin planning started 
Recommendations
The Concepts such as whole of government approaches, interagency cooperation, and independent, military-led government institutions enter the discussion as ways to facilitate effective transitions. The focus of interagency cooperation is to achieve unity of effort.
Independent government institutions build greater capacity within the military to affect other elements of national power such as economic, and this would maintain the capacity to create conditions favorable for post-conflict environments. The problem with these approaches is the lack of integration. Solving these problems may contribute to addressing the desire to achieve unity of effort, but if planning does not synchronize, coordinate, and integrate these elements, success is doubtful. The three historical case studies highlighted these issues, so what does it mean for current and future operations?
There are several implications for Afghanistan contained within these examples. If
Afghanistan planners are to link tactical actions to strategic objectives to conclude Operation Enduring Freedom by 2014, there are three key recommendations. First, initiating transition planning now to identify enduring functions, resources needed to maintain these functions, and initiate actions to ensure these resources are available in 2014 or before. Much like Operation Eclipse planning identified a lack of resources for a military government initiated additional training; early planning helps Afghanistan planners. It will enable them to start coordination for not only military, but also need civilian resources to continue critical functions past 2014.
Early planning enables the discourse between other planners and civilian counterparts to define conditions, identify requirements, and inform current operations. In order to facilitate transitions for Operation Enduring Freedom, planners must start early to initiate the cognitive discourse involved. As Iklé mentions in Every War Must End, consensus becomes harder to achieve as the war draws closer to the end and especially if success seems unlikely. Early Finally, planners should refine the plan to achieve the desired conditions. In other words, transition the plan from the conceptual plan to the detailed plan so that it can be executed and achieve strategic aims. This may seem self-evident, but if planning and dialogue are not initiated, then detailed planning will be inadequate if completed at all. In planning for Operation Just Cause and Promote Liberty, a lack of discourse failed to flesh out Blind Logic and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not approve the plan until it was evident resources allocated to XVIII Airborne Corps were insufficient to maintain peace after hostilities ceased. 
Conclusion

